Drawing together institutional papers, the trade-and national-press, and MassObservation documents, this article examines the changing ways that the Advertising Association justified commercial advertising from 1939 to 1951. It argues that the ability to repeatedly re-conceptualise the social and economic purposes of advertising was central to the industry's survival and revival during the years of war and austerity. This matters because the survival and revival of commercial advertising helps to explain the composition of the post-war mixed economy and the emergence of a consumer culture that became the 'golden age' of capitalism. While commercial advertising's role in supporting periods of affluence is well documented, much less is known about its relationship with war and austerity. This omission is problematic. Advertising was only able to shape the 1950s and 1960s economy because its corporate structures remained intact during the 1940s, as the industry withstood the challenges of wartime and the difficulties presented under Attlee's government.
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During the 1920s and 1930s leaders of the British advertising industry presented advertising as a force that stimulated trade by opening up new markets, creating and nurturing consumer demand, and improving the efficiency of distribution.
1 Advertising, they argued, contributed to prosperity and supported the cause of international peace. Having justified their professional calling though the pursuit of peace and affluence, however, during the 1940s advertising came under great pressure. War, government controls and austerity made the public claims of the industry seem hollow, irrelevant, and even contrary to the national interests. In 1942 the Economist commented that 'it is a gross disservice to stimulate the desire to spend or to foster shop crawling', while a proposed tax on commercial advertising in 1947 aimed to curb inflationary tendencies in the economy caused by excessive consumption. 2 Yet by 1951, advertising had not just survived but was undergoing a remarkable revival. Despite the editor of Advertiser's Weekly's observation that 'ours is a cheerful business that rides uneasily with depression and frustration', the industry had remained buoyant during a decade of controls, and had carved out a place for advertising in a planned economy. 3 The purpose of this article is to examine the changing ways that the British advertising industry justified commercial advertising from 1939 to 1951, and to demonstrate that the ability to repeatedly re-conceptualise the social and economic purposes of advertising was central to the industry's preservation during the years of war and austerity. This matters because the survival and revival of commercial advertising helps to explain the composition and the economic role of advertising was more limited in war and austerity than in periods of affluence. For instance, throughout the 1940s commercial goods were strictly rationed, making the primary function of advertising, to stimulate demand, redundant. The acute shortage of newsprint meant that commercial advertisements were smaller and fewer than they had been during the inter-war period, while, in contrast, there was an unprecedented volume of government publicity.
Yet this omission is problematic. Advertising was a central component in the economic, social and cultural adjustments of post-war Britain, but it was only able to play such a role because its corporate structures remained intact during the 1940s as the industry withstood the considerable challenges of wartime and the further financial and ideological difficulties presented under Attlee's government. It is important to understand how and why it survived. Recognising the deliberate attempts of advertising people to promote a social and economic role for commercial advertising during this period demonstrates the resilience of the advertising industry in times of acute stress. It invites us to reconsider the inevitability of post-war affluence.
A focus on the arguments and assumptions of the advertising industry (rather than the government) about the role of commercial advertising also offers fresh insight into the changing values of twentieth-century Britain. It was during the years of wartime propaganda and material scarcity that the seeds of the Cold War debate about consumer education, freedom of choice, and the centrality of advertising and communication in democratic society were sown. Nixon and Schwarzkopf have shown that the appropriation of contemporary rhetoric was central to the self-promotion of advertising practitioners from the 1950s 6 onwards. 11 However, the debate surrounding advertising as they describe it is too rigid; criticism of advertising took time crystallise into the political left and right. This article takes a chronological approach to explain the evolution of the language and themes used by advertising people during war and austerity to justify advertising, revealing the genesis of ideas that came to prominence in the post-war years. Through their justification of advertising in the 1940s, leaders of advertising engaged with ideas about the role of the state in controlling consumption in democratic societies; citizenship, consumer choice and resource allocation; about the social value of private profit; the balance between planning and the freedom of speech; and about competing visions of economic futures and social ideals. These issues were central to contemporary debate about the type of society that Britain was, and hoped to become in future.
The strategies of the advertising industry during the 1940s are seen in the activities of the Advertising Association (AA), which are recorded in the organisation's papers at the History of Advertising Trust archive and in both the national and trade press. As the overarching trade body for the British advertising industry, the AA took a leading role in justifying commercial advertising to the government, to businessmen and to the public. The AA represented the interests of the four interdependent groups of people who worked in advertising: advertisers, the firms that paid for campaigns in order to advertise their goods and services; advertising agents, who produced and placed advertising campaigns; auxiliary industries including printers, art studios, and block makers; and media owners, the most important of which in this period was the press. Disagreements between affiliated groups are recorded in the minutes of the AA's meetings; the advertising industry was not always united.
In the absence of a critical voice from a press that was financially reliant on advertising, and 11 Nixon, 'In Pursuit of the Professional Ideal'; Nixon, '"Salesmen of the Will to Want"; Schwarzkopf, 'They do it with Mirrors'.
with business archives scattered and incomplete, the AA sheds light on debates not seen elsewhere in the public sphere. It is a crucial source for addressing questions about the survival and revival of commercial advertising in war and austerity.
Brand names, goodwill, and service to the nation.
In 1939, the advertising industry was concentrated in London in order to serve the headquarters of national and international firms. William Crawford demonstrated to Whitehall the potential of advertising to sell products during his service on the Empire Marketing Board. 15 By the end of the 1930s, therefore, the industry had established an economic need for commercial advertising based on the ability of advertising to increase and support consumption of branded goods.
The principle challenging facing the advertising industry on the outbreak of war was a sharp decline in business. The economic uncertainty of war made advertisers wary and unwilling to commit to advertising campaigns. A memorandum circulated at the London office of J. Walter Thompson, a leading American advertising agency, read: 'the great majority of our clients cancelled all advertising immediately on the declaration of war. In the case of several of them, it is almost certain that they will be unable to resume advertising until the end of the war'. 16 The case of J. Walter Thompson appears to be typical, although lack of data makes it difficult to describe accurately the contraction of the industry.
Nevertheless, Nicholas Kaldor estimated that total expenditure on advertising fell from £91 million in 1938 to just £35-40 million in 1943. 17 Kaldor acknowledges, however, that a 'large part' of the wartime figure represented government (rather than commercial) sponsored publicity, meaning that the gross decline was even greater. Indeed, as the war progressed, the creation and management of government publicity became an important source of revenue for advertising agencies in lieu of commercial clients, although, unlike in the United States goodwill and reputation built up from products in past years'. 24 The public were encouraged to 'buy branded goods, and be safe'. 25 Unwisely, the advertisements adopted the instructive tone of early wartime government propaganda, much maligned by the public, which included the inept slogan that 'your courage, your cheerfulness, your fortitude will bring us victory'.
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The campaign was scare-mongering, and its narrow focus on sustaining consumer goodwill to safeguard manufacturers' investment did not sit well in the economic climate of increasing scarcity and sacrifice. 12 branded article once demand for ARP curtains had subsided. 30 Mass-Observation noted points of the AA's campaign in a field-report on public attitudes to press advertising, which suggests that the message was also being heard by consumers. 34 Moore, 'Branded Goods'.
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industry and the long-term social benefits that employment would bring to the post-war economy, rather than just profit for advertisers.
However, the more immediate problem of increasing paper shortages prompted questions in parliament from MPs across parties about the need for 'goodwill' advertising of 'unproducible' luxury goods in wartime, especially since these advertisements appeared to be financed through money diverted from the Excess Profits Tax. 35 The persistence of advertising campaigns in the press suggests that many firms had been persuaded of the importance of maintaining consumer goodwill through advertising. However, certain MPs remained unconvinced. With space in newspapers at a premium as paper supplies ran low, some MPs felt that government announcements should take precedence over 'wasteful'
advertisements. 36 This attitude extended beyond parliament. A Mass Observation survey of Londoners in January 1942 found that about a third were definitely against advertising (describing it as 'utterly useless', and a waste of paper and resources), a third were 'tolerant', and the remainder 'doubtful or disinterested'. 37 In the face of mounting criticism, it was vital that the AA addressed the mystification about commercial advertising and stem the growing hostility towards it. The AA's solution was a pamphlet, 'Advertising in War-time', which was published in March 1942. Over 1,400 copies were distributed among newspapers and the affiliated members of the AA, and it was 'reprinted in part or whole in many publications'. 39 The arguments it set out were a marked shift away from the AA's initial focus on maintaining business for advertising by persuading firms of the need to sustain consumer goodwill. Instead, turning to address the general public, the AA explained how it envisaged the social and economic role of advertising more broadly, and how commercial advertising worked to benefit the whole nation.
First, in order to justify commercial advertising in newspapers, the AA emphasised the part that advertising had played historically in building up and maintaining a press free from government control; indeed, by the turn of the twentieth century, advertising already
accounted for approximately 50% of a newspaper's revenue. 40 In the pamphlet, the AA argued that, in contrast to 'political parties and private interests', commercial advertisers' motives were plain to see in their advertisements, and that advertisers had 'neither the desire nor the power to influence the freedom of editorial expression'. 41 criticised the press as a reliable or disinterested source of information or instruction'. 43 The AA argued that increased newspaper dependence on government announcements for income would further compromise the independence of the press, which was already bound by strict censorship rules. Advertising, then, was presented as an expression of and support for democracy, through its sustenance of a free press, and with it, freedom of speech. 44 This argument would become increasingly important for the advertising industry in the late 1940s
as the Cold War became entrenched.
Second, the AA pointed to how advertisements helped the war effort through the guidance that they offered to the public 'in the difficult task of adaption to war conditions'.
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In the absence of goods to sell, firms -and their advertising agents -were imaginative in keeping brand names before the public. railings and the role of prayer in wartime. 48 Therefore, the AA claimed confidently that commercial advertising was 'doing a job which would otherwise have to be done in other ways'. 49 Clampin and Crawford both point to how advertising campaigns supported the propaganda messages of government; here it is significant that the AA specifically cast commercial advertising in this role. 50 The benefit to advertisers in running such campaigns was, of course, maintaining consumer goodwill, but unlike the AA's 1940 campaign, the pamphlet placed emphasis firmly on how commercial advertising served the public interest.
Third, in wartime, the AA argued, advertising helped to sustain morale: advertising's cheerful hints and tips provided 'variety and relief' in the contents of a newspaper, which otherwise carried grave news. More obscurely, the AA claimed that advertising could raise the morale of industrial workers if they saw the fruits of their efforts advertised. The
Economist dismissed this argument as 'so pompishly foolish as to come close to spoiling a sound case'. 51 Yet, by praising workers' production, the AA suggested that advertising could counter workers' alienation. This is surprising in the context of the mid-century Marxist critique of advertising, which presented advertising as distracting people from lack of satisfaction in productive work by drawing attention instead to the sphere of consumption (similar to the AA's former argument that advertising provided relief from bad news).
The pamphlet ended with a patriotic statement that committed advertising to the service of the nation, and called for an end to attacks on advertising that worked to achieve that end. In so far as it represents a hindrance to the war effort or a dissipation of resources or energy on unessential things, [commercial advertising] is justly condemned. In so far as it can be shown to be helping in the war effort, however indirectly, or in the preservation of the things for which we are fighting, it should be protected and encouraged so far as circumstances will allow.
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By 1942, therefore, the AA had shifted its justification of commercial advertising from increasing the consumption of branded goods, to emphasising instead advertising's role in maintaining the consumer goodwill necessary for a smooth transition to a post-war economy, as well as supporting freedom of speech and civilian morale.
Establishing a factual basis for advertising
The pamphlet received favourable coverage in the press. However, the episode raised 'great extravagance', and suggested that rather than increasing the economy, advertising merely 'transferred business from one manufacturer to another'. The advertising industry was used to condemnation. What was concerning about these bodies of criticism was that they focused not only on the wartime role of advertising, but also on its place in society following the war. During the war, the future economic direction of Britain was uncertain, and, given the trend towards socialist and fascist planned economies, it is unsurprising that some feared that the post-war economy would 'have planned consumption, planned distribution and planned production which will oust advertising completely'. 57 While this view was an extreme, most economists at the time understood themselves as working within a paradigm of 'market socialism', which by blending public ownership with market economy left commercial advertising in a reduced role. These questions suggested the economic effects of advertising were more sophisticated than simply increasing consumption. Advertising practitioners had explored some of these relationships during the inter-war period, but lacked data to support their claims. 63 Therefore, in a further change of strategy, the AA hoped to demonstrate statistically that advertising contributed positively to the national economy, and on this basis to suggest that, in addition to sustaining profit for firms, advertising worked 'for the good of the community' and, therefore, had an essential role in the post-war economy. 64 Questions about advertising's aesthetics and ethics were placed beyond the scope of the study; the AA sought to argue its case in purely social and economic terms. An economic enquiry would yield seemingly concrete results, which would be easier to use as evidence than more philosophical ideas about aesthetic merit. The Times made public the aims of the inquiry in its 'City Notes' section on 3 June 1943, which placed the study firmly in the context of the financial sector.
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The AA also used the investigation as positive publicity for the industry: advertising was 62 
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presented as a sector that, despite the difficulties of war, was subjecting itself to independent critical appraisal of its practice and social role.
The study was published in pamphlet form in 1946, and then as a book in 1948. It was more limited than originally planned, as a preliminary investigation suggested that the original scope was impossible given the 'wartime limitations on manpower'. Instead, the investigation focused on the more modest aim of establishing 'the main facts as to the role of advertising in the national economy'. 66 Advertising was defined as 'any activity designed to spread information with a view to promoting the sales of marketable goods and services', which explicitly excluded advertising funded by the government. The report found that in 1935, the total amount spent on advertising was £89.4 million (with a 5% margin of error). This was a third larger than the national expenditure on newspapers, periodicals and new books combined. 69 When locating advertising within the economy, the investigation found enormous variation in spending between industries and that advertising was heavily concentrated among particular firms. Sectors where advertising cost more than 40% of the value of the sales included baby goods, health salts, tonic wine, 71 The report also showed the extent to which the press relied on advertising for revenue: in 1935 total expenditure on the press was £105 million, of which the public spent £56.7 million on newspapers and advertisers spent £48.4 million on purchasing space.
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Therefore, advertising subsidised the cost of newspapers by approximately 40%. Given the importance of a free press in sustaining democracy, an ideal for which the Second World War was fought, this was an important statistic; the study indicated that advertising made newspapers affordable, while enabling the press to remain free from government influence.
The study set an important precedent for further analysis: The Times suggested that 'the regular provision of data of these and similar kinds, independently and regularly collected and analysed, would be of the highest value'. 73 While the Economist agreed that more facts about advertising were necessary, it argued that 'statistics alone will not provide the complex psychological and social information on which a considered national policy towards advertising needs to be based'. 74 Perhaps most of all, then, the study drew attention to how much remained unknown about the economics of advertising and its social effects. Until further, more conclusive, evidence was found about the impact of advertising, the advertising industry was left with room to negotiate a place for commercial advertising in post-war Britain on a fairly broad basis. 
Advertising in austerity: exports, education, and freedom
Many wartime justifications for commercial advertising, especially those relating to goodwill, were based on the assumption that firms would be able to supply consumers with the brands that they had continued to advertise once hostilities ceased. However, . 75 Yet, in spite of, or perhaps because of, government measures, by 1947 it appeared as if 'the home front ran on without a war to sustain it'. 76 Commercial advertising had no obvious place in these plans; indeed, Hugh Dalton's proposed tax on advertising in 1947, which was designed to save 'labour and materials employed in advertising, and [avoid] the incitement to consumers to try to buy goods which are in short supply', suggested that he viewed the industry as counterproductive to them.
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Although Stafford Cripps abandoned the tax following outcry from the industry, and advertisers agreed instead to a voluntary reduction of 15% on advertising expenditure by firms spending over £2,500 on advertising 'scarce and luxury goods', the episode was a setback. It wasn't that the government deemed advertising to be ineffective; quite the opposite. The Attlee government spent more public money on publicity than any previous government in order to make the nation's economic problems intelligible to the general public. 78 Rather, the problem facing the advertising industry was that the government 75 Jim Tomlinson, 'Planning: Debate and Policy in the 1940s', Twentieth Century British History, 3
believed that domestic demand should be curtailed in order to keep inflationary tendencies under control when goods continued to be scarce.
Export trade, where goods were sold outside of the domestic economy, was an early opportunity for the advertising industry to resume its primary work of promoting consumption, while also demonstrating that commercial advertising benefitted the national economy. In 1945 Britain was heavily in debt. The war had cost over half the nation's wealth and two-thirds of its export trade; in 1945, it lacked the means to pay for more than a third of its essential imports. 79 A vast increase in production was required to correct the adverse balance of payments, and export trade was deemed essential for British recovery. 
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People were consuming less, meaning that more goods could be exported. The advertising industry's response to this was to advise advertisers to encourage people in their productive work through commercial advertising that promoted brand goodwill, rather than seeking to increase domestic consumption. Speaking at the AA's 1947 convention Amy Pearce, of the advertising agency Saward Baker, pointed to the work of women in supporting family morale, which was crucial for the 'national drive for effort'. Pearce urged advertisers to give housewives 'rays of optimism' in their advertising, and promised that in return, housewives would help 'to remove those obstacles which now stand in the way of prosperity'. 86 As in wartime, advertising people showed how commercial advertising could sustain morale and reinforce the messages of government communication, in addition to generating goodwill and continued sales for firms that advertised. 
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The advertising industry recognised the narrowing gap between commercial advertising and government publicity, which the war had blurred. 87 Following the war, manufacturers continued to provide patriotic advice and information, while advertising agencies continued to create campaigns for a government that sought to educate the public to be informed and responsible citizens. Campaigns produced by advertising agencies for the Attlee administration included the productivity campaign, the road safety campaign and the promotion of immunization against diphtheria, in addition to campaigns that were adjuncts of economic information propaganda. 88 Such government publicity remained important sources of revenue for advertising agencies, but, more significantly, they affected the way that the industry justified advertising.
Speaking at the AA's 1947 convention, the advertising agent J. B. Nicholas suggested that the democratic system depended on the 'ad hoc education and guidance of popular opinion'. It was 'the science of public relations and advertising' he claimed, that was 'the modern instrument… capable of applying this guidance without coercion -under free conditions.' 89 The idea of using advertising to educate the public dates back to the 1920s; indeed, the Empire Marketing Board's campaigns from 1926 to 1931, which
Crawford oversaw, were explicitly based on consumer education. What was different in the late 1940s, however, was that the advertising industry believed the public read advertisements produced by commercial interests in the same way as they did government announcements: carefully and critically, treating them as sources of information. Reflecting on how the war had changed advertising and consumer behaviour, Harold Mackintosh, the confectionary manufacturer and president of the AA, argued that consumers had 'got used to the idea of looking to advertisements for guidance and for information, and not as something 87 90 This was evident in a Mass-Observation survey where 48% respondents found advertising useful, and while 'nearly all the men in "B" class were indifferent', '"C" classes (both sexes) found advertisements particularly useful'.
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The long-term social and political consequences for the public sphere of this closer relationship between advertising and the government are highly contested; although the public backlash against the industry following the publication of Vince Parkard's The
Hidden Persuaders (1959) suggests that by the late 1950s consumers did not appreciate the industry's attempts to 'guide public opinion'. 92 The significance here is that Nicholas and others presented commercial advertising, alongside the developing field of public relations, as a vital, distinct component of the success of democratic societies because of its potential to educate and inform, and believed that consumers would make the 'right' choice if given the 'right' message.
The importance of an educated public gained prominence as the peace after the Second World War descended into Cold War, and the rhetoric of 'freedom' and 'choice' was used increasingly in the public domain. In 1947, the Royal Commission on the Press was tasked 'with the object of furthering the free expression of opinion through the press and the greatest practicable accuracy in the presentation of news'. 93 The Commission criticised the press for presenting over-simplistic accounts rather than trying to educate readers. Significantly, it also dismissed claims that advertisers had undue influence in news reportage, despite the extent to which newspapers relied on advertising revenue (Kaldor's report had claimed 40% of the press's income was derived from advertising).
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Reacting against the continued restrictions placed on business and advertising by the 
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Advertising contributed greatly to the enjoyment, comfort, and fullness of our lives. Good advertising did not persuade people to buy more than they required; it taught them how adequately to satisfy their needs. It helped to make taste selective. Good advertising did not bludgeon the will -it refined and cajoled the taste. The immediate success that the advertising industry achieved when justifying advertising is difficult to measure, especially since the press, reliant on advertising revenue, tended to present it positively. However, that Mass-Observation surveys cited the industry's justifications for commercial advertising suggests at least that arguments were being heard, acknowledged, and repeated in the public domain, despite some continuing strong feeling against advertising. Ultimately, the advertising industry survived. The willingness of advertising people to re-imagine advertising meant that they were well prepared to take advantage of the improved economic conditions of the 1950s and 1960s, while adapting to the new political challenges presented by commercial television, Americanisation, and fear of subliminal control.
